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Pennsylvania's "Registration of Sexual Offenders"
Statute: Can It Survive a Constitutional Challenge?

I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 29, 1994, Jesse Timmendequas lured his seven-year-old
neighbor, Megan Kanka, into his house by offering to show her his
new puppy.1 Megan never returned home. When police questioned
Timmendequas about Megan's disappearance, he confessed to
raping and strangling Megan. 2 It was not until after police arrested
Timmendequas for Megan's murder that Megan's parents and their
neighbors learned that Timmendequas and his two roommates were
3
convicted sex offenders.
Megan's murder caused the community of Hamilton Township,
New Jersey, to cry out: "People should be told if there's a sexual
offender on the block."4 Within a week, 100,000 people signed
petitions supporting a community notification law in New Jersey.5
New Jersey's governor and legislature responded quickly.6 By
August 15, 1994, legislation mandating registration and community
notification was introduced in the General Assembly of New
Jersey.' The General Assembly declared a "legislative emergency"
and rushed the bills through the system, bypassing committees and
8
hearings.
On October 31, 1994, the governor signed New Jersey's
Registration and Community Notification Laws. 9 This legislation,
referred to as "Megan's Law", requires those who have committed
certain designated crimes involving sexual assault to register with
1.

Rick Hampson, What's Gone Wrong With Megan's Law, USA TODAY, May 14, 1997, at

lA.
2. Id.
3. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1997). Timmendequas had two prior
convictions of sex offenses involving young girls. Id. at 1081.
4. Rick Hampson, supra note 1, at 1A
5. Id.
6. E.B., 119 F3d at 1081.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1082. See NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 -2C:7-11 (West 1995).
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local law enforcement upon release from prison. ° In addition,
Megan's Law provides for the distribution of information to the
community about those required to register."
10. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sunimarized the operation
of the registration provision of New Jersey's Megan's Law as follows:
The registration provision requires all persons who complete a sentence for certain
designated crimes involving sexual assault after Megan's Law was enacted to register
with local law enforcement. NJ.SA 2C:7-2b(1). Those committing these offenses and
completing all incarceration, probation, and parole before the Laws enactment must
register only if, at the time of sentencing, their conduct was found to be
'characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior.' Id.
The registrant must provide the following information to the chief law enforcement
officer of the municipality in which he resides: name, social security number, age,
race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, hair, and eye color, address of legal residence,
address of any current temporary legal residence and date and place of employment.
NJ.SA. 2C:7-4b(l). He must confirm his address every ninety days, notify the
municipal law enforcement agency if he moves, and reregister with the law
enforcement agency of any new municipality. NJ.SA 2C:7-2d to e.
The registration agency then forwards the registrant's information, as well as any
additional information it may have, to the prosecutor of the county that prosecuted
the registrant. N.J.SA 2C:7-4c to d. The prosecutor, in turn, forwards the information
to the Division of State Police, which incorporates it into. a central registry and
notifies the prosecutor of the county in which the registrant plans to reside. Id. This
information is available to law enforcement agencies of New Jersey, other states, and
the United States. NJ.SA 2C:7-5. The registration information is not open to public
inspection. Law enforcement agencies are authorized to release "relevant and
necessary information concerning registrants when . . . necessary for public
protection," but only in accordance with the notification procedures we describe
below. Failure of the sex offender to comply with registration is a fourth-degree
crime. Id.
Artway v. New Jersey, 81 E3d 1235, 124-3 (3d Cir. 1996).
11. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the
notification provisions of New Jersey's Megan's Law as follows:
The prosecutor of the county in which the registrant plans to live must consider the
information provided through registration and, in consultation with the prosecutor of
the convicting county, determine whether the registrant poses a low, moderate or high
risk of re-offense. N.I.SA 2C:7-8d(1). In maling that determination, the prosecutor
must consider guidelines the Attorney General has promulgated pursuant to the Act.
N.ISA 2C:7-8a to b.
The determination of risk as low, moderate, or high places the registrant in
corresponding notification categories: Tier 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3. Under Tier 1 (low risk),
the prosecutor must notify law enforcement agencies likely to encounter the
registrant. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8c(1). Under Tier 2 (moderate risk), the prosecutor, working
with local law enforcement agencies, must notify schools, licensed day care centers,
summer camps, and designated community organizations involved in the care of
children or the support of battered women or rape victims. NI.SA 2C:7-8c(2). Under
Tier 3 (high risk), law enforcement agencies are required to notify members of the
public likely to encounter the registrant. N.J.SA 2C:7-8c(3).
The prosecutor makes this future risk determination using the "Registrant Risk
Assessment Scale," promulgated by the Attorney General. See Registration and
Community Notification Bench Manual 26. The Scale is a matrix of thirteen categories
organized into four larger headings: (1) Seriousness of Offense; (2) Offense History,
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Other states quickly followed New Jersey's lead, enacting their
own versions of Megan's Law. In 1996, Congress implemented a
federal version of Megan's Law by amending the 1995 version of
the Jacob-Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Program.1 2 The Megan's Law amendment
made the following changes to the Jacob-Wetterling Act: (1) it
eliminated the general requirement that information collected under
state registration programs be treated as private data; and (2) it
substituted mandatory language for permissive language concerning
the release of information that is necessary to protect the public
from registered sexual offenders. 13 The amended Jacob-Wetterling
Act requires states to implement registration and notification
programs as a condition of receiving certain federal funds.14 By
May 1996, forty-nine states had enacted registration laws for
convicted sex offenders; thirty-two states had implemented
15
community notification laws.
(3) Characteristics of the Offender, and (4) Community Support. Id. (footnote
omitted). The prosecutor scores each of these categories for different levels of risk low, moderate, or high. Id. In doing so, he or she is guided by commentary that
includes factual examples. Id. at 17-25. This initial risk score is multiplied by
coefficients that differ by category, and the data is tabulated for a final risk
assessment score. Id. at 26. Finally, the prosecutor must consider whether two
exceptions apply. "If an 'offender has indicated that he will reoffend if released into
the community and the available record reveals credible evidence to support this
finding, then the offender will be deemed a high risk. . . ." Id. at 16. Conversely, "if
the offender demonstrates a physical condition that minimizes the risk of reoffense,
then the offender will be deemed to be a low risk." Id.
The form of notification under Tiers 2 and 3 includes the registrant's name, a recent
photograph, his physical description, offense, address, place of employment or
schooling, and a description and license plate number of the registrant's vehicle. Id. at
39. Those notified under Tier 2 are informed that the information is not to be shared
with the general public, and every notification must contain a warning about the
criminal consequences of vandalism, threats and assaults against the registrant or any
of his associates. Id. at 40.
Artway, 81 E3d at 1243-44.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1995). The Jacob-Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program, which was enacted in 1994 as part of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, required states to implement
registration laws covering sexual offenders as a condition of receiving certain federal
funding.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 14071. Prior to the Megan's Law amendments, the Jacob-Wetterling
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program permitted states
to release information regarding sexual offenders to the public. The amendments made this
release of information mandatory. See APPENDIX A to this article for the full text of the
Jacob-Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Program, as amended by Megan's Law.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 14071.
15. E.B., 119 F3d at 1081.
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PENNSYLVAmA'S LAW

The Pennsylvania legislature enacted its version of Megan's Law
on October 24, 1995.16 Under Pennsylvania's Registration of Sexual
Offenders statute ("Act"),1 7 any individual convicted of one or more
specified crimes after April 21, 1996, is presumed (by the State
Board to Assess Sexually Violent Predators ("the Board") and by
the court) to be a "sexually violent predator." 8 The crimes falling
within the scope of the Act are: rape, 9 involuntary deviate sexual
22
intercourse, 20 aggravated indecent assault, 21 spousal sexual assault,
16. Registration of Sexual Offenders, 42 PA- CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9791-9799.6 (West Supp.
1997).
17. Id.
18. Registration of Sexual Offenders, 42 PA, CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9794 (West Supp. 1997).
A sexually violent predator is defined as: "A person who has been convicted of a sexually
violent offense as set forth in section 9793(b) (relating to registration of certain offenders for
ten years) and who is determined to be a sexually violent predator under section 9794(e)
(relating to designation of sexually violent predators) due to a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent
offenses." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9792. The State Board to Assess Sexually Violent Predators is
comprised of "psychiatrists, psychologists and criminal justice experts, each of whom is an
expert in the field of the behavior and offenders." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9799.3(a).
19. "Rape" is defined by the Crimes Code of Pennsylvania as:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he or she engages in sexual
intercourse with a complainant:
(1) By forcible compulsion.
(2) By threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person
of reasonable resolution.
(3) Who is unconscious or where the person knows that the complainant is
unaware that the sexual intercourse is occurring.
(4) Where the person has substantially impaired the complainant's power to
appraise or control his or her conduct by administering or employing, without
the knowledge of the complainant, drugs, intoxicants or other means for the
purposes of preventing resistance.
(5) Who suffers from a mental disability which renders the complainant
incapable of consent.
(6) Who is less than 13 years of age.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121 (1995).
20. "Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse" is defined by the Crimes Code of
Pennsylvania as:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he or she engages in deviate
sexual intercourse with a complainant:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person
of reasonable resolution;
(3) who is unconscious or where the person knows that the complainant is
unaware that the sexual intercourse is occurring;
(4) where the person has substantially impaired the complainant's power to
appraise or control his or her conduct by administering or employing, without
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kidnapping (if the victim is a minor and the actor is not a parent of
the knowledge of the complainant, drugs, intoxicants or other means for the
purpose of preventing resistance;
(5) who suffers from a mental disability which renders him or her incapable of
consent;
(6) who is less than 13 years of age; or
(7) who is less than 16 years of age and the person is four or more years older
than the complainant and the complainant and person are not married to each
other.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3123 (1995).
21. Section 3125 of the Crimes Code of Pennsylvania provides:
[A] person who engages in penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of a
complainant with a part of the person's body for any purpose other than good faith
medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures commits aggravated indecent
assault, a felony of the second degree, if:
(1) the person does so without the complainant's consent;
(2) the person does so by forcible compulsion;
(3) the person does so by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent
resistance by a person of reasonable resolution;
(4) the complainant is unconscious or the person knows that the complainant
is unaware that the penetration is occurring;
(5) the person has substantially impaired the complainant's power to appraise
or control his or her conduct by administering or employing, without the
knowledge of the complainant, drugs, intoxicants or other means for the
purpose of preventing resistance;
(6) the complainant suffers from a mental disability which renders him or her
incapable of consent;
(7) the complainant is less than 13 years of age; or
(8) the complainant is less than 16 years of age and the person is four or more
years older than the complainant and the complainant and the person are not
married to each other.
18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3125 (1995).
22. The statutory provision defining the crime of "sexual assault" was repealed in 1995.
Before the statute was repealed, it provided:
(a) Sexual assault.
A person commits a felony of the second degree when that person engages in
sexual intercourse with that person's spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person
of reasonable resolution; or
(3) who is unconscious.
(b) Involuntary spousal deviate sexual intercourse.
A person commits a felony of the second degree when that person engages in
deviate sexual intercourse with that person's spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person
of reasonable resolution; or
(3) who is unconscious.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3128 (1984). The crime is still relevant to Pennsylvania's Megan's Law
since individuals who were convicted of spousal sexual assault before it was repealed are
subject to the registration provisions of the statute.
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the victim), 23 promoting prostitution (if the victim is a minor), 24 or
distributing obscene or other sexual materials and performances (if
the victim is a minor). 25 After conviction, but before sentencing, the
23. Section 2901 of the Crimes Code of Pennsylvania provides:
A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another a substantial
distance under the circumstances from the place where he is found, or if he
unlawfully confines another for a substantial period in a place of isolation, with any of
the following intentions:
(1) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage.
(2) To facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter.
(3) To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another.
(4) To interfere with the performance by public officials of any governmental or
political function.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2901(a) (1983).

24. Section 5902(b) of the Crimes Code of Pennsylvania provides:
A person who knowingly promotes prostitution of another commits a misdemeanor
or felony as provided in subsection (c) of this section [relating to grading of offenses].
The following acts shall, without limitation of the foregoing, constitute promoting
prostitution:
(1) owning, controlling, managing, supervising or otherwise keeping, alone or in
association with others, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business;
(2) procuring an inmate for a house of prostitution or a place in a house of
prostitution for one who would be an inmate;
(3) encouraging, inducing, or otherwise intentionally causing another to become
or remain a prostitute;
(4) soliciting a person to patronize a prostitute;
(5) procuring a prostitute for a patron;
(6) transporting a person into or within this Commonwealth with -intent to
promote the engaging in prostitution by that person, or procuring or paying for
transportation with that intent;
(7) leasing or otherwise permitting a place controlled by the actor, alone or in
association with others, to be regularly used for prostitution or the promotion
of prostitution, or failure to make reasonable effort to abate such use by
ejecting the tenant, notifying law enforcement authorities, or other legally
available means; or
(8) soliciting, receiving, or agreeing to receive any benefit for doing or agreeing
to do anything forbidden by this subsection.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5902 (1995).
25. Subsections 5903(a)(3)-(6) of the Crimes Code of Pennsylvania provide:
(a) Offenses defined.
No person, knowing the obscene character of materials or performances involved,
shall: . . .

(3) design, copy, draw, photograph, print, utter, publish or in any manner
manufacture or prepare any obscene materials;
(4) write, print, publish, utter or cause to be written, printed, published or
uttered any advertisement or notice of any kind giving information, directly or
indirectly, stating or purporting to state where, how, from whom, or by what
means any obscene materials can be purchased, obtained or had;
(5) produce, present or direct any obscene performance or participate in a
portion thereof that is obscene or that contributes to its obscenity; or
(6) hire, employ, use or permit any minor child to do or assist in doing any act
or thing mentioned in this subsection.
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Board must conduct an assessment of the individual to determine if
he or.she is a sexually violent predator.26 When the assessment is
completed, the court reviews the Board's findings in a hearing and.
determines whether it agrees with the Board's finding that the
defendant is a "sexually violent predator."2 During the hearing, the
defendant may rebut the presumption that he or she is a sexually
28
violent predator by clear and convincing evidence.
If the court finds that the defendant is not a sexually violent
predator, but merely an "offender,"2 the defendant must register
his or her address with the Pennsylvania State Police for ten
years.30 This ten-year period begins when the offender is released
from incarceration, placed on parole, or commences a sentence of
intermediate punishment or probation.3 ' Offenders must also verify
their residences with the State Police annually and notify that
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5903 (1990).
26. 42 PA CONS. STAT. § 9794. Pursuant to a court order requesting an assessment of
the defendant, two members of the board conduct an assessment to determine if the
defendant is a sexually violent predator. 42 PA CONS. STAT. § 9794(a). Factors considered
during the assessment include, but are not limited to: the age of the defendant; the age of
the victim; the number of victims; the prior criminal record of the defendant; drug use by the
defendant; mental illness or disability of the defendant; nature of the sexual contact with the
victim; whether there was a display of unusual cruelty toward the victim; behavioral
characteristics of the defendant; and prior participation in programs for sexual offenders and
prior sentences. 42 PA CONS. STAT. § 9794(c).

27. 42 PA CONS. STAT. § 9794(e). Section 9794(e) provides:
(e) Court review of findings.
Upon receipt of the board's report, the court shall determine if the offender is a
sexually violent predator. This determination shall be made based on evidence
presented at a hearing held prior to sentencing and before the trial judge. The
offender and district attorney shall be given notice of the hearing and an opportunity
to be heard, the right to call witnesses, the right to call expert witnesses and the right
to cross-examine witnesses. In addition, the offender shall haye the right to counsel
and to have a lawyer appointed to represent him if he cannot afford one. After a
review of all evidence presented at this hearing, the court may determine whether the
presumption arising under subsection (b) has been rebutted and shall set forth this
determination on the sentencing order. A copy of the sentencing order containing the
determination shall be submitted to the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
and the Department of Corrections.
Id.

28. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9794(b). "Clear and convincing proof' is defined as "proof
which results in reasonable certainty of the truth of the ultimate fact in controversy." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 251 (6th ed. 1990).
29. An "offender," as referred to in this comment, is an individual who has been
convicted of one of the predicate offenses and required to register, but has not been
determined to be a sexually violent offender.
30. 42 PA CONS. STAT. § 9793(a) (West Supp. 1997).
31.

42 PA CONS. STAT. § 9793(a).
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authority within ten days of the change of address.32
An individual who is determined to be a sexually violent predator
must register with the Pennsylvania State Police for the rest of his
or her life or until the designation of sexually violent predator is
terminated.3 A sexually violent predator must also verify his or her
address with the State Police every ninety days,3 inform the State
Police of a new address within ten days of a change of address,3
and attend monthly counseling sessions. 36 In addition, the sexually
3
violent predator is subject to the public notification process.
32. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9793(a).
33. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9795. An offender who has been designated as a sexually
violent predator is entitled to petition a court with original jurisdiction to reconsider the
designation one year prior to release from prison and at five year intervals thereafter. 42 PA
CONS. STAT. § 9794(0. When such a petition is made, the court may review the original
determination and request a new report from the Board. 42 PA CONS. STAT. § 9794(f). If, upon
reconsideration, the court disagrees with the prior designation, the court may terminate the
original designation by issuing a court order and notifying the Pennsylvania State Police. 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 9794(f).
34. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9796(a). Subsection 9796(a) of the Registration of Sexual
Offenders provides:
The Pennsylvania State Police shall verify the residence of sexually violent predators
every 90 days through the use of a nonforwardable verification form to the last
reported address. The form shall be returned within ten days.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9796(a).
35. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9796(c). Subsection 9796(c) provides:
A change of address of an offender required to register under this subchapter reported
to the Pennsylvania State Police shall be immediately reported by the Pennsylvania
State Police to the appropriate law enforcement agency having jurisdiction of the
offender's new place of residence. The Pennsylvania State Police shall, if the offender
changes residence to another state, notify the law enforcement agency with which the
offender must register in the new state.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9796(c).
36. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9799.4(b) (West Supp. 1997). Section 9799.4(b) provides:
The sexually violent predator shall be required to attend at least monthly counseling
sessions in a progran approved by the board and be financially responsible for all
fees assessed from such counseling sessions, If the sexually violent predator can
prove to the satisfaction of the court that the person cannot afford to pay for the
counseling sessions, that person shall still attend the counseling sessions and the
parole office shall pay the requisite fees.
42 PA- CONS. STAT. § 9799.4(b).
37. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9798. Specifically, the public notice provision provides:
§ 9798 Other notification
(a) By municipality's chief law enforcement officer.
Notwithstanding any of the provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 91 (relating to criminal
history record information), the chief law enforcement officer of the police
department of the municipality where a sexually violent predator lives shall be
responsible for providing written notice as required under this section.
(1) The notice shall contain:
(i) The name of the convicted sexually violent predator.
(ii) The address or addresses at which he resides.
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Finally, a sexually violent predator must be sentenced upon a first
conviction to lifelong parole; subsequent convictions mandate life
imprisonment. 38
(iii) The offense for which he was convicted.
(iv) A statement that he has been designated by court order as a
sexually violent predator, which designation has or has not been
terminated as of a date certain.
(v) A photograph of the sexually violent predator, if available.
(2) The notice shall not include any information that might reveal the victim's
name, identity and residence.
(b) To whom written notice is provided.
The chief law enforcement officer shall provide written notice, under subsection
(a), to the following persons:
(1) Neighbors of the sexually violent predator.
(2) The director of the county children and youth service agency of the county
where the sexually violent predator resides.
(3) The superintendent of each school district and the equivalent official for
private and parochial schools enrolling students up through grade 12 in the
municipality.
(4) The director of each licensed day care center and licensed preschool
program in the municipality.
(5) The president of each college, university and community college located
within 1,000 feet of a sexually violent predator's address.
(c) Urgency of notification.
The municipal police department's chief law enforcement officer shall provide
notice within the following time frames:
(1) To neighbors, notice shall be provided within 72 hours after information of
the sexually violent predator's release date and address has been received by
the chief law enforcement officer. Notwithstanding the provisions of
subsections (a) and (b), verbal notification may be used if written notification
would delay meeting this time requirement.
(2) To the persons specified in subsection (b)(2), (3), (4) and (5), notice shall
be provided within seven days after the chief law enforcement officer receives
information regarding the sexually violent predator's release date and address.
(d) Public notice.
All information provided in accordance with subsection (a) shall be available, upon
request, to the general public.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9798.
38. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9799.4. Subsections 9799.4(a),(c) and (d) outline the mandatory
sentencing provisions:
(a) Increased mandatory maximum sentence.
Upon the court's finding that the offender is a sexually violent predator, the
offender's maximum term of confinement for any offense or conviction specified in
section 9793(b) (relating to registration of certain offenders for ten years) shall be
increased to the offender's lifetime notwithstanding lesser statutory maximum
penalties for these offenses..
(c) Mandatory sentence.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, when a person who has
been designated as a sexually violent predator is convicted of a subsequent sexually
violent offense, the mandatory sentence shall be life imprisonment. Should a previous
conviction be vacated and an acquittal or final discharge entered subsequent to
imposition of sentence under this section, the offender shall have the right to petition
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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

Numerous defendants who have been subjected to the
Pennsylvania Registration of Sexual Offenders statute are
challenging the Act's constitutionality by asserting that it violates
several provisions of the United States Constitution and the
Pennsylvania Constitution. The following Constitutional arguments
have been raised: the Act violates the Double Jeopardy., 9 Bill of
Attainder, 40 Cruel and Unusual Punishment,41 Ex Post Facto, 42 Due
the sentencing court for reconsideration of sentence if this section would not have
been applicable except for the conviction which was vacated.
(d) Authority of court in sentencing.
There shall be no authority in any court to impose on an offender to which this
section is applicable any lesser sentence than provided for in subsection (c), to place
such offender on probation or to suspend sentence. Nothing in this section shall
prevent the sentencing court from imposing a sentence greater than that provided in
this section. Sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing shall not supersede the mandatory sentences provided in this section.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9799.4(a),(c),(d).
39. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONsr. amend. V. In explaining the guarantees and
protections provided under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution,
the Supreme Court of the United States stated, "The guarantee [against double jeopardy] has
been said to consist of three separate constitutional protections. It protects against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction. Also, it protects against multiple punishments for the
same offense." United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980) (quoting North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
40. Section 9 of Article I of the United States Constitution provides, "No Bill of
Attainder... shall be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. "Bills of Attainder" are "legislative acts,
no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable
members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial
trial. . . ." United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 448-49 (1965).
41. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, "nor [shall]
cruel and unusual punishments [be] inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. As explained by the
Supreme Court of the United States, "[T]he Eighth Amendment bars not only those
punishments that are "barbaric" but also those that are "excessive" in relation to the crime
commnitted. Under Gregg, a punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no
measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime." Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (citing
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
42. Section 9 of Article I of the United States Constitution provides, "No . . . ex post
facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. An "ex post facto" law has been defined by
the Supreme Court of the United States as:
[A]n ex post facto law is one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not
punishable at the time it was committed; or an additional punishment to that then
prescribed; or changes the rules of evidence by which less or different testimony is
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Process 43 and Right to Privacy" guaranteed by the United States
Constitution; and the Act is void for vagueness. 45
After the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Kansas
v. Hendricks46 and the subsequent decision of the United States
47
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in E.B. v. Verniero,
Pennsylvania's version of Megan's Law will likely survive a majority
of the challenges raised under the United States Constitution. The
statute may, however, fail constitutional scrutiny on procedural due
process grounds.
In Kansas v. Hendricks, Hendricks, an inmate with a long history
of convictions for sexually molesting children, challenged the
constitutionality of Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act ("the
sufficient to convict than was then required; or, in short, in relation to the offense or
its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage; but the
prescribing of different modes or procedure and the abolition of courts and creation
of new ones, leaving untouched all the substantial protections with which the
existing law surrounds the person accused of crime, are not considered within the
constitutional inhibition.
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46 (1990) (emphasis added) (quoting Duncan v. Missouri,
152 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1894) (other citations omitted)).
43. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, "No person shall
be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of Law.. . ." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. V. In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides,
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
Law..
. ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "There are two aspects [of due process]: procedural,
in which a person is guaranteed fair procedures and substantive which protects a person's
property from unfair governmental interference or taking." BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY 500 (6th
ed. 1990).
44. The Supreme Court of the United States explained:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of
decisions . . . , the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In
varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the
roots of that right in the First Amendment,... in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,.
in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, ... in the Ninth Amendment, . . . or in the
concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment....
These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' ...
are included in this
guarantee of personal privacy.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citations omitted).
45. The "void for vagueness" doctrine is defined as "[a] law which is so obscure in its
promulgation that a reasonable person could not determine from a reading what the law
purports to command or prohibit is void as violative of due process. The doctrine means
that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand
that his contemplated conduct is proscribed." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1574 (6th ed. 1990)
(citing United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 33 (1963)).
46. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
47. 119 F.3d 1077 (1997).
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VPA7). 48 In 1994, shortly before his scheduled release from prison,
proceedings to commit Hendricks under the VPA were instituted. 49
After subjecting Hendricks to the procedure provided for by the
VPA, a jury unanimously determined, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Hendricks was a "sexually violent predator."50 The trial court
subsequently committed Hendricks to the Secretary of Social and
Rehabilitation Services.5' Hendricks appealed, asserting that the
application of the Act was a violation of the due process, double
jeopardy and ex post facto provisions of the United States
Constitution. 52 The Supreme Court of Kansas did not address
Hendrick's double jeopardy and ex post facto claims, but held that
the VPA violated "substantive due process" because it required a
mental abnormality or personality disorder, rather than a mental
disease.5 On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States
48. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2076 (1997). Kansas' Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 was enacted as a response to the high recidivism
rates of sex offenders. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2077. The VPA establishes a civil commitment
proceeding which provides for long-term care and treatment of sexually violent predators.
Id. Specifically, the VPA provides:
(1) The local prosecutor is notified 60 days before the anticipated release of an
inmate fitting the Act's criteria;
(2) the prosecutor decides within 45 days whether to file a petition seeking the
involuntary commitment of that inmate;
(3) if such a petition is filed, the court must then determine whether probable cause
exists to support the finding that the inmate is a 'sexually violent predator';
(4) upon such a determination, the inmate is sent to a facility for evaluation;
(5) following this evaluation, a jury trial is held to determine whether the inmate is a
sexually violent predator beyond all reasonable doubt;
(6) if the inmate is found to be such a predator, he or she is placed in the custody of
the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services for treatment until his or her
mental abnormality or personality changes.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a17. A "sexually violent predator" is defined by the VPA as "any
person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to
engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994). A
"mental abnormality" is defined by the VPA as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting
the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent
offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others."
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b).

49. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
50. Id. During the jury trial, Hendricks admitted to sexually molesting children for
approximately twenty years and "stated that the only sure way he could keep from sexually
abusing children in the future was 'to die.'" Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2079.
53. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (1996). Substantive due process "requires
legislation to be fair and reasonable in content" BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990).
In support of its holding, the Supreme Court of Kansas relied on Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71 (1992) (holding that a Louisiana statute which provided for confinement of an
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disagreed, finding that the VPA definition of "mental abnormality"
violated the requirements of substantive due process.' The Court
also rejected Hendricks' contention that the VPA provided for
criminal punishment.55 Concluding that the VPA nature was
nonpunitive, the Court found that the Act did not violate the United
States Constitution's prohibition on double jeopardy and ex post
facto laws.
insanity acquittee on the basis of his antisocial personality violated substantive due process
since it did not require a finding of a mental illness).
54. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079. The Court recognized that liberty interest is not
absolute and an individual's interest in avoiding physical restraint may be overridden
explaining:
"[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person
within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all
times and in all circumstances, wholly free from restraint. There are manifold
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On
any other basis organized society could not exist with safety to its members."
Id. (quoti g Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905)). The Court then
determined that the VPA prerequisites of future dangerousness and a mental abnormality
were consistent with the Court's prior understanding of ordered liberty Id. at 2080 (citing
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (upholding a Kentucky statute permitting the commitment
of dangerous and "mentally retarded" or "mentally ill" individuals); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S.
364 (1986) (upholding an Illinois statute providing for the commitment of dangerous and
"mentally ill" individuals).
55. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081. The Court first noted that the VPA was placed within
the Kansas probate code, not the criminal code, and created a "civil comnmitment procedure,"
not a criminal procedure. Id. at 2082. It also determined that the VPA did not implicate
retribution or deterrence, the two primary objectives of criminal punishment. Id.
Furthermore, the Court recognized that the VPA uses prior crimes solely as evidence of
mental abnormality or future dangerousness and "does not affix culpability for prior criminal
conduct." Id. Other factors that the Court also considered in determining that the VPA had a
nonpunitive purpose: (1) the VPA lack of a scienter requirement; (2) its focus on persons
who are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement; (3) its provision for immediate
release if the person is adjudged to be safe at large; and (4) the fact that the confinement
conditions for persons covered by the VPA are essentially the same as those of other civilly
committed individuals. Id. at 2082-83.
56. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085. Recognizing that the Double Jeopardy Clause
prevents States from "punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally for
the same offense," the Court disagreed with Hendricks' argument that the VPA fails both the
"multiple punishments" test and the "same elements" test. Id. at 2085-86. The Court
determined that confinement after imprisonment was not a multiple punishment stating:
"[T]here is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is
nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments." If an individual otherwise
meets the requirements for involuntary civil commitment, the State is under no obligation to
release that individual simply because the detention would follow a period of incarceration."
Id. at 2086 (quoting Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966)).
The Court also rejected Hendricks' contention that the VPA failed the "same elements" test
of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), explaining that "the Blockburger test
...simply does not apply outside of the successive prosecution context." Hendricks, 117 S.
Ct. at 2086. The Blockburger test provides, "where the same act or transaction constitutes a
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether
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Following the Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Hendricks,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed
the constitutionality of the community notification provisions of
New Jersey's Megan's Law in E.B. v. Verniero.57 E.B. v. Verniero
consolidated two separate actions: E.B. v. Verniero58 and W.P v.
Verniero.9 In both actions, sex offenders who were subjected to
the consequences of New Jersey's Megan's Law challenged the
notification requirements of the law by asserting that they violated
the ex post facto, double jeopardy, and procedural due process
grounds. 6° On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the public
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which
the other does not." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (citation omitted).
57. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom., W.P. v.
Verniero, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998). The Third Circuit had previously rejected challenges to the
registration requirement of New Jersey's Megan's Law under the Ex Post Facto and Double
Jeopardy Clauses. Artway v. New Jersey, 81 F3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996). In Artway, a sexual
offender who was released from prison in 1992, asserted that enforcement of Megan's Law
would violate his equal protection and due process rights as well as his rights not to be
punished in violation of the ex post facto, bill of attainder and double jeopardy clauses. Id.
at 1245. The court held that Artway's claim against the notification provisions of New
Jersey's Megan's Law was not ripe since Artway was not subject to the notification
provisions under the law. Id. at 1252-53. The court did, however, address Artway's claim with
regard to the registration provisions. Determining that the registration requirements did not
constitute punishment, the court held that they did not violate the Ex Post Facto, Bill of
Attainder, and Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution. Id. at 1253-67. In
addition, the court rejected Artway's contentions that the registration provisions of the law
violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Id. at 1267-70.
58. E.B., 119 F3d at 1087. In 1974, E.B. pled guilty to three offenses of sexual abuse in
the Superior Court of New Jersey. Id. After serving his sentence in New Jersey, followed by
a sentence for murder charges in Virginia, E.B. was released from prison, subject to
supervision by the New Jersey Bureau of Parole. Id. As required by New Jersey's Megan's
Law, E.B. registered with authorities. Id. Classifying E.B. as a Tier 3 sexual offender, the
local prosecutor proposed to issue notification in the neighborhood of E.B.'s residence. Id. at
1087-88. E.B. objected to the classification and notification, but the Superior Court of New
Jersey agreed with the classification and permitted the notification. Id. at 1088. Following his
unsuccessful appeals to the New Jersey appellate division and supreme court, E.B. filed a
federal action against the New Jersey Attorney General, the local county prosecutor, and the
police chief. Id. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey entered a
preliminary injunction enjoining the community notification. Id. See E.B. v. Poritz, 914 F
Supp. 85 (D. N.J. 1996). The defendants appealed from the district court's order. E.B., 119
F3d at 1088.
59. E.B., 119 F3d at 1087. W.P v. Verniero was a class action representing twenty-two
plaintiffs who had been classified as Tier 2 or Tier 3 sexual offenders. Id. at 1088. The
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey initially entered a preliminary
injunction precluding notification for any of the members of the class; however, the court
later entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the New Jersey Attorney
General, and various local prosecutors. Id. See WP v. Poritz, 931 F Supp. 1187 (D. N.J.
1996), rehearing denied, 931 F. Supp. 1199 (D. N.J. 1996). The plaintiffs appealed from the
entry of summary judgment. E.B., 119 F3d at 1088.
60. E.B., 119 F3d at 1087.
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notification provisions do not constitute "punishment" and,
therefore, do not violate the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto
Clauses of the United States Constitution.61 The court did, however,
determine that the Due Process Clause forbids placing the burden
of persuasion on the registrant and requires the State of New
Jersey to carry the burden of justifying the classification and
notification plan by clear and convincing evidence. 62 Without
comment or dissent, the Supreme Court of the United States denied
certiorari on E.B. v. Veniero.63 The denial of certiorari has been
interpreted as eliminating most doubts about the constitutionality
of the various states' community notification laws. 64
At this time, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not granted
certiorari on the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law.
Only the Commonwealth Court of PennsylvaniaW5 and the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania have addressed the issue.66 In Van Doren v.
61. Id. 1111. The court found that Megan's Law was intended by the state legislature to
serve remedial goals and that the design, history, and effects of the law do not undermine
this nonpunitive intent. Id. at 1096-1105. It also concluded that the risk of private violence
and other adverse effects weren't great enough or linked closely enough with the notification
process itself to contradict the legislature's remedial intent Id.
62. Id. at 1107-11. Finding a liberty interest under the New Jersey Constitution, the
Third Circuit determined that New Jersey's Megan's Law violated procedural due process by
placing the burden of persuasion on the registrant, rather than the state. Id. at 1111.
" BLAiC's LAW
"Procedural due process" is "the guarantee of procedural fairness ....
DIMCONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990).
In analyzing the procedural due process claim, the Third Circuit applied the test set forth
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 421 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), which defines three distinct factors:
first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id.
The court found that the state should bear the burden of persuasion since the registrant's
interest in obtaining an accurate determination of the relevant issues of fact in a Megan's
Law hearing is greater than the state's interest; the state will not incur a substantial
economic or other burden by shouldering the burden of persuasion and the risk of error will
be reduced. E.B., 119 F3d at 1109. In addition, the Third Circuit determined that procedural
due process requires the state to meet its burden by clear and convincing evidence, rather
than by a preponderance of evidence. Id. at 1111.
63. See W.P. v. Verniero, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
64. David G. Savage, Supreme Court Rejects Challenge to Original Megan's Law,
PrrrsBURGH PosT-GAzT'rE, Feb. 24, 1998, at A8.
65. Van Doren v. Mazurkiewicz, 695 A.2d 967 (Pa. Commw. 1997).
66. Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 702 A.2d 565 (Pa. Super. 1997); Commonwealth v. Davis,
708 A.2d 116, (Pa. Super. 1998), allocatur denied, 1998 WL 310466 (Pa. Jun. 15, 1998). The
issue of the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law is currently being reviewed by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in two cases on direct appeal from the Court of
Common Pleas of Erie County. Commonwealth v. Stovall, 83 Appeal Docket 1997;
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Mazurkiewicz, an inmate at the State Correctional
Institute-Rockview filed an action against the Superintendent of the
prison following the circulation of a memorandum informing
inmates of the effects of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law.67 Challenging
the registration provisions of the statute, Van Doren asserted that
the statute violated the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
provisions of the United States Constitution.6 Applying the test set
forth by the Third Circuit in Artway, the commonwealth court
concluded that the actual purpose, objective purpose, and effect of
the registration provisions of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law were
nonpunitive. 69 Therefore, the court rejected Van Doren's argument
and held that the registration provisions of Pennsylvania's Megan's
Law did not violate the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto
Clauses of the United States Constitution.70
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the
commonwealth court's rationale. In Commonwealth v. Gaffney, the
superior court held that the registration provisions of
Pennsylvania's Megan's Law do not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the United States Constitution. 71 The court concluded
Commonwealth v. Williams, 84 Appeal Docket 1997. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania may
review direct appeals from courts of common pleas under 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 722(7) which
provides:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of
the courts of common pleas in the following classes of cases: ...
(7) Matters where the court of common pleas has held invalid as repugnant to
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or to the Constitution of
this Commonwealth, any treaty or law of the United States or any provision of
the Constitution of, or of any statute of, this Commonwealth, or any provision
of any home rule charter.
42 PA.CONS. STAT. § 722(7).
67. Van Doren, 695 A.2d at 968. Van Doren, who was serving a ten-year prison sentence
for statutory rape (18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3122), involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with
someone under 16 years of age (18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3123(a)(5)), indecent assault (18 PA
CONS. STAT. § 3126) and incest (18 PA CONS. STAT. § 4302). Van Doren challenged the
constitutionality of the registration provisions and requested injunctive and declaratory relief
by filing a Petition for Review. Id. at 969. Superintendent Mazurkiewicz and the Attorney
General filed preliminary objections in response to Van Doren's petition. Id. The
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania decided to review Van Doren's Petition for Review as
a request for declaratory judgment, noting that the memorandum circulated by the
Superintendent was not a final appealable order invoking the original jurisdiction of the
commonwealth court. Id. at 970-71.
68. Id. at 971.
69. Id. at 976.
70. Id.
71. Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 702 A.2d 565, 566-70. In Gaffney, Dennis Gaffney, who
pled guilty to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault, and
corruption. of minors, and was subject to the registration provisions of Megan's Law, claimed
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that Gaffney failed to provide any evidence that the effects of the
Pennsylvania statute differ from those of the New Jersey statute
and, therefore, rejected Gaffney's contention that the registration
provisions of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the United States Constitution. 72 Similarly, the court also
determined in Gaffney that the registration provisions of
Pennsylvania's Megan's Law did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.73
In Commonwealth v. Davis, the superior court addressed a
Double Jeopardy challenge to Pennsylvania's Megan's Law.74 The
court rejected the argument that the hearing provided to sexually
violent predators pursuant to Title 42 was a "second trial," stating,
"[A]ppellant [Davis] has not been 'charged' with being a sexually
violent predator."75 The court also rejected Davis' contention that
that Megan's Law was an Ex Post Facto law. Id. at 566. Like the commonwealth court, the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania determined that the Third Circuit's test for punishment,
which was outlined in Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263, should be applied to the Pennsylvania
statute. Goffney, 702 A.2d at 567-68.
72. Id. at 568.
73. Id. at 569. The Ex Post Facto provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution states "no
ex post facto law... shall be passed." PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 17. Explaining that the standards
applied to determining an ex post facto violation under the Pennsylvania Constitution are
comparable to those used under the United States Constitution, the court referred to the
decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Young, 637 A.2d 1313
(Pa. 1993). In Young, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated, "[als our interpretation of
the state constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws has been consistent with that
of the Supreme Court of the United States' interpretation of the federal prohibition, the
analysis of appellant's federal ex post facto claim disposes his state claim as well." Young,
637 A.2d at 1317, n.7. The superior court recognized that this statement indicates both, that
the state and federal provisions are identical, and that prior to Young, the federal ex post
facto standards were applicable to state ex post facto claims. Gaffney, 702 A.2d at 569. The
superior court concluded that the lack of punishment in the registration provisions of
Pennsylvania's Megan's Law prevents a violation of Pennsylvania's ex post fact prohibition.
Id. at 569-70.
74. Commonwealth v. Davis, 708 A.2d 116, 119 (Pa. Super Ct. 1998). The appellant in
Davis asserted that the trial court was required to conduct a hearing on his Motion for
Extraordinary Relief which challenged the constitutionality of Megan's Law on Double
Jeopardy Grounds. Davis, 708 A.2d at 119.
75. Id. The court explained:
Megan's Law recognizes that the societal interest of protecting our youngsters from
molesters is paramount to the privacy rights of the molester and permits the court to
presume that an individual convicted of molesting young children is a sexually violent
predator.... [T]he hearing merely provides a convict with a pre-sentence opportunity
to rebut the statutory presumption. Obviously, the phrase 'sexually violent predator'
denotes designation; nowhere ... is there support for appellant's characterization of
the phrase as a 'charge' or an 'offense.' Moreover, the hearing itself does not impose a
greater punishment upon appellant. Rather, if at the hearing appellant cannot rebut
the presumption that he is a sexually violent predator, then he will be subject to the
maximum sentencing provisions provided for at 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.4.
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the presumption of being a "sexually violent predator" was a
greater included offense of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,
76
the crime for which he was convicted.
Although the commonwealth court's decision in Van Doren and
the superior court's decisions in Gaffney and Davis were limited to
specific constitutional issues, trial courts throughout Pennsylvania
have considered the constitutionality of the entire statute' 7
Pennsylvania courts of common pleas that have analyzed the
constitutional challenges of the statute seem to agree that the
statute does not violate the right to privacy,7 8 is not void for
vagueness,7 9 and does not violate the bill of attainder 8° guarantees
Id. at 120.
76. Id. at 120. Noting that the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require
an evidentiary hearing for pre-sentence motions for extraordinary relief, the court affirmed
the trial court's denial of Davis's motion. Id.
77. See Commonwealth v. Koller, No. 96 CR 000474 (C.P. Bradford County, May 19,
1997); Commonwealth v. Beam, No. 3328 C.D. 1996 (C.P. Dauphin County, Jul. 30, 1997);
Commonwealth v. Ames, No. 471 C.A. 1997 (C.P. York County, Aug. 28, 1997);
Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 922 of 1997 (C.P Erie County, Sept. 23, 1997);
Commonwealth v. Tate, No. 689 of 1996 (C.P. Crawford County, Oct 22, 1997);
Commonwealth v. Larson, No. 2095 of 1996 (C.P. Erie County, Oct. 28, 1997); Commonwealth
v. Morris, No. 0597 of 1997 (C.P Philadelphia County, Oct. 29, 1997); Commonwealth v.
Alejandrez, No. 3494 of 1996 (C.P Lancaster County, Nov. 20, 1997); Commonwealth v.
Sanchez, No. 1456-1997 (C.P Northampton County, Jan. 26, 1998); Commonwealth v.
Rickabaugh, No. 97 CR 272, 273 (C.P. Blair County, Jan. 26, 1998).
78. Judge Temin of Philadelphia County, Judge DiSantis of Erie County, and Judge
Uhler of York County agreed in their respective memorana that the registration and
notification provisions of the statute fails to violate protections of the right to privacy under
the United States Constitution. See Morris, No. 0597 of 1997 (C.E Philadelphia County, Oct.
29, 1997); Williams, No. 922 of 1997 (C.P Erie County, Sept. 23, 1997); Ames, No. 471 C.A.
1997 (C.P. York County, Aug. 28, 1997). Judge Temin and Judge DiSantis relied on the
Supreme Court of the United States decision in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) and the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in E.B. v. Verniero, 119
F3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997) to support their positions. In Paul, the Supreme Court of the United
States rejected the contention that the distribution of fliers to merchants by law enforcement
officials which described possible shoplifters violated the constitutional right to privacy. 424
U.S. at 693. The Supreme Court emphasized the difference between reputational interests in
that particular situation from those relating to marriage, procreation, and child rearing. Paul,
424 U.S. at 713.
79. Judge Callen of Lancaster County, Judge Temin of Philadelphia County, Judge
DiSantis of Erie County, and Judge Freedberg of Northampton County all cited the Supreme
Court of the United States' decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) as
support for their conclusions that Pennsylvania's statute is not void for vagueness.
Alejandrez, No. 3494 of 1995 (C.E Lancaster County, Nov. 20, 1997) at 25-26, Morris, No.
0597 of 1997 (C.E Philadelphia County, Oct. 29, 1997) at 8-10, Williams, No. 922 of 1997 (C.E
Erie CountySept. 23, 1997) at 5-6; Sanchez, No. 1456-1997 (C.E Northhampton County, Jan.
26, 1998) at 22-23. In Hendricks, the Supreme Court held that the definition imposed by the
state of Kansas for "mental abnormality" satisfied substantive due process. Hendricks, 117 S.
Ct. at 2079. Judge Lewis of Dauphin County and Judge Uhler of York County relied on the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal Co., 515
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of the United States Constitution; however, the courts have
conflicting views on whether the statute violates the double
jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishment, and procedural due
process protections of the United States Constitution. The trial
court decisions that have addressed the double jeopardy and cruel
and unusual punishment challenges may be separated into two
groups: those that have examined the statute's notification
provisions"' and those that have analyzed the statute's sentencing
provisions.8 2 The courts of common pleas concede that although
the notification provisions do not constitute punishment,s3 the
A.2d 1358 (Pa. 1986) to support their conclusions that Pennsylvania's statute is not void for
vagueness. Beam, No. 96 3328 C.D. 1996 (C.P. Dauphin County, Jul. 30, 1997) at 19-20; Ames,
No. 471 C.A. 1997 (CP. York County, Aug. 28, 1997) at 24-26. In Parker White Metal, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected a vagueness challenge to a Pennsylvania drunk
driving law stating, "[T]he void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define
the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." Park White Metal, 515 A.2d at 1367 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
357 (1983)).
Finding that Pennsylvania's Megan's Law is not a penal statute, Judge Lewis and Judge
Uhler recognized that the "concept of 'vagueness' has limited application"; therefore, they
determined that the statute, particularly the notification provisions, is not vague. Beam, No.
96 3328 C.D. 1996 (C.P. Dauphin County, Jul. 30, 1997) at 19; Ames, No. 471 C.A. 1997 (C.P.
York County, Aug. 28, 1997) at 24-25.
80. Concluding that the community notification provisions of Pennsylvania's statute do
not constitute punishment, Judge Lewis of Dauphin County and Judge Uhler of York County
determined that the statute is not a Bill of Attainder. Beam, No. 96 3328 C.D. 1996 (C.P.
Dauphin County, Jul. 30, 1997) at 14; Ames, No. 471 C.A. 1997 (C.P. York County, Aug. 28,
1997) at 23. Judge Freedberg of Northampton County, Judge Cullan of Lancaster County, and
Judge Temin of Philadelphia County cited United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), when
discussing the Bill of Attainder issue. Sanchez, No. 1456-1997 (C.R Northhampton County,
Jan. 26, 1998) at 27; Alejandrez, No. 3494 of 1995 (C.P. Lancaster County, Nov. 20, 1997) at
37; Morris, No. 0597 of 1997 (C.R Philadelphia County, Oct. 29, 1997) at 5-6. In Bron, the
Supreme Court of the United States explained that a Bill of Attainder is one that labels
"named individuals or easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial." Broum, 381 U.S. at 44849. Recognizing that the
sentencing provisions of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law are punishment, Judge Cullen, Judge
Freedberg, and Judge Temin concluded that the statute is not a Bill of Attainder since the
designation of being a sexually violent predator is made by the court, after a judicial
proceeding, rather than the legislature. Alejandrez, No. 3494 of 1995 (C.P. Lancaster County,
Nov. 20, 1997) at 37; Sanchez, No. 1456-1997 (C.R Northhampton County, Jan. 26, 1998) at
23; Morris, No. 0597 of 1997 (C.P. Philadelphia County, Oct. 29, 1997) at 6.
81. See Ames, No. 471 C.A. 1997 (C.P. York County, Aug. 28, 1997); Beam, No. 96 3328
C.D. 1996 (C.P. Dauphin County, Jul. 30, 1997).
82. See Koller, No. 96 CR 000474 (C.P Bradford County, May 19, 1997); -Morris, No.
0597 of 1997 (C.P. Philadelphia County, Oct. 29, 1997); Sanchez, No. 1456-1997 (C.P.
Northhampton County, Jan. 26, 1998); Alejandrez, No. 3494 of 1995 (C.P. Lancaster County,
Nov. 20, 1997).
83. Ames, No. 471 CA. 1997 (C.R York County, Aug. 28, 1997) at 23; Beam, No. 96 3328
C.D. 1996 (C.P. Dauphin County, Jul. 30, 1997) at 14. Applying both the two-prong test for
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sentencing provisions do. 4 The courts, however, have not uniformly
decided whether the sentencing provisions, as punishment, violate
the Double Jeopardy and Cruel and Unusual Clauses.
In Commonwealth v. Alejandrez, Judge Cullan of Lancaster
County determined that the proceeding in which an offender's
status as a sexually violent predator is examined constitutes a
second prosecution for the same offense for which the offender
had already been convicted. Therefore, the court concluded that
the statute violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.8 5 In addition,
Judge Cullan concluded that the imposition of a maximum life
sentence is cruel and unusual punishment since it is based on
mental status and potential dangerousness, rather than prior
punishment used by the Supreme Court in Hendricks and the Third Circuit's three-prong test
for punishment set forth in Artway, the courts concluded that the notification provisions of
Pennsylvania's Megan's Law do not constitute punishment. Ames, No. 471 C.A. 1997 (C.P.
York County, Aug. 28, 1997) at 15-23; Beam, No. 96 3328 C.D. 1996 (C.P. Dauphin County, Jul.
30, 1997) at 7-14. The courts, therefore, concluded that the notification provisions do not
violate the double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the United
States Constitution. Ames, No. 471 C.A. 1997 (C.P. York County, Aug. 28, 1997) at 23; Beam,
No. 96 3328 C.D. 1996 (C.P. Dauphin County, Jul. 30, 1997) at 14.
84. Judge Mott of Bradford County, Judge Temin of Philadelphia County, Judge
Freedberg of Northampton County, and Judge Cullen of Lancaster County each found that
Pennsylvania's Megan's Law provides for punishment since it imposes a mandatory maximum
sentence of life imprisonment if a defendant is determined to be a sexually violent predator.
Koller, No. 96 CR 000474 (C.P. Bradford County, May 19, 1997) at 3; Morris, No. 0597 of 1997
(C.P. Philadelphia County, Oct. 29, 1997) at 6; Sanchez, No. 1456-1997 (C.P. Northhampton
County, Jan. 26, 1998) at 7; Alejandrez, No. 3494 of 1995 (C.P. Lancaster County, Nov. 20,
1997) at 15.
85. Applying the test set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), Judge Cullen concluded that the predicate
offense for which a defendant has been convicted and the designation as a sexually violent
predator are the "same offense" within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Alejandrez, No. 3494 of 1995 (C.P. Lancaster County, Nov. 20, 1997) at 29. In Blockburger,
the Supreme Court explained that "the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not . . ." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. Judge Cullen also determined that the hearing
provided for by Pennsylvania's Megan's Law is a separate criminal proceeding and, therefore,
constitutes a second prosecution. Alejandrez, No. 3494 of 1995 (C.P. Lancaster County, Nov.
20, 1997) at 32. In making this determination, Judge Cullen compared Megan's Law to
Pennsylvania's Barr-Walker Act and the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, which were both found
unconstitutional on due process grounds. See United States ex. rel Gerchman v. Maroney, 355
F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Judge Cullen acknowledged
that both the Barr-Walker Act and the Colorado Sex Offenders Act were ruled
unconstitutional on due process rather than double jeopardy grounds; however, Judge Cullen
relied on the Supreme Court and Third Circuit descriptions of the proceedings provided for
in the acts. Alejandrez, No. 3494 of 1995 (C.P. Lancaster County, Nov. 20, 1997) at 30.
In Gerchman and Specht, the acts were determined to be criminal proceedings, rather than
sentencing proceedings. Gerchman, 355 F.2d at 309; SPechtr v. Patterson, 386 US. 605,
608-09 (1967).
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criminal history.86
In contrast, Judge Freedberg of Northampton County, Judge
Temin of Philadelphia County, and Judge Mott of Bradford County
rejected arguments that Megan's Law violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the United States Constitution.8 7 In Commonwealth v.
Morris and Commonwealth v. Sanchez, Judges Temin and
Freedberg concluded in their respective opinions that
Pennsylvania's Megan's Law does not subject a defendant to a
second prosecution for the same offense; it merely provides for a
sentencing hearing to determine the appropriate sentence allowed
by law.ta They both explained that a separate proceeding may be
held to decide a distinct issue that addresses punishment alone.8
They also found that the mandatory maximum sentence of life,
imposed by the statute, is not cruel and unusual punishment.9
Judge Mott of Bradford County explained that the sentencing
provisions of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law are only enhancements of
the maximum sentence, not a separate punishment.9'
The issue of whether Pennsylvania's Megan's Law violates the
procedural due process protections of the United States
Constitution is even more controversial than the double jeopardy
and cruel and unusual punishment challenges. Trial courts are split
86. Alejandrez, No. 3494 of 1995 (C.P. Lancaster County, Nov. 20, 1997) at 33-34 Judge
Cullen found that Megan's Law imposes punishment for a status, instead of an act Id, (citing
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)). In Robinson, the Supreme Court held that the
imposition of a punishment is cruel and unusual if it inflicts punishment for a status offense.
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
87. Sanchez, No. 1456-1997 (C.P. Northhampton County, Jan. 26, 1998) at 21; Morris,
No. 0597 of 1997 (C.P. Philadelphia County, Oct. 29, 1997) at 6-7; Koller, No. 96 CR 000474
(C.R Bradford County, May 19, 1997) at 15.
88. Sanchez, No. 1456-1997 (C.P Northhampton County, Jan. 26, 1998) at 21.
89. Morris, No. 0597 of 1997 (C.P. Philadelphia County, Oct 29, 1997) at 7; Sanchez,
No. 1456-1997 (C.P. Northhampton County, Jan. 26, 1998) at 21 (citing Graham v. West
Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912) (holding that the West Virginia recidivist statute did not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause).
90. Morris, No. 0597 of 1997 (C.P Philadelphia County, Oct. 29, 1997) at 11; Sanchez,
No. 1456-1997 (C.P. Northhampton County, Jan. 26, 1998) at 21-22. Judge Temin explained
that future dangerousness can be used to enhance a sentence. Morris, No. 0597 of 1997 (C.P.
Philadelphia County, Oct. 29, 1997) at 11 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
Judge Freedberg recognized that the legislature could have imposed a mandatory life
sentence for the predicate offenses without violating the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause. Sanchez, No. 1456-1997 (C.P. Northhampton County, Jan. 26, 1998) at 22, n.30 (citing
Phipps v. State, 385 A.2d 90 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (holding that life imprisonment for
rape is not constitutionally proscribed cruel and unusual, noting twenty-six jurisdictions
where life sentences are possible).
91. Commonwealth v. Koller, No. 96 C.R. 000474 (C.P. Bradford County, May 18, 1997)
at 15.
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on this issue. In addressing procedural due process, some trial
courts compared Pennsylvania's Megan's Law with Pennsylvania's
"Barr-Walker Act."92 In United States ex. rel. Gerchman v.
Maroney,93 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the Barr-Walker Act violated procedural due process. 94 In
Commonwealth v. Dooley, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held
the Barr-Walker Act unconstitutional. 95 Although Judge Temin of
Philadelphia County noted the differences between the Barr-Walker
92. Morris, No. 0597 of 1997 (C.. Philadelphia County, Oct. 29, 1997) at 11-18;
Rickabaugh, No. 97 CR 272, 273 (C.P Blair County, Jan. 26, 1998). Pennsylvania's
Barr-Walker Act provided for an indeterminate sentence for certain sex offenders. The Act
provided, in particular.
§ 1166. Indeterminate sentence for certain sex offenses.
For the better administration of justice and the more efficient punishment,
treatment, and rehabilitation of persons convicted of the crime of indecent assault,
incest, assault with intent to commit sodomy, solicitation to commit sodomy, sodomy,
assault with intent to ravish or rape, if the court is of the opinion that any such
person, if at large, constitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the public, or is
a habitual offender and mentally ill, the court, in lieu of the sentence now provided by
law, for each such crime, may sentence such person to a State institution for an
indeterminate term having a minimum of one day and a maximum of his natural life.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1167 (1952).
§ 1167. Psychiatric examination of person convicted.
No person, convicted of a crime punishable in the discretion of the court, under the
provisions of this act, with imprisonment in a State institution for an indeterminate
term having a minimum of one day and a maximum of his natural life, shall be so
sentenced until (1) a complete psychiatric examination shall have been made of him
through the facilities of the Department of Welfare, as hereinafter provided, or by a
psychiatrist designated by the court, the results of whose examination shall be
transmitted to, and accepted by, the Department of Welfare in lieu of an examination
made through its own facilities, and (2) a complete written report thereof shall have
been submitted to the court. Such report shall include all facts and findings necessary
to assist the court in determining whether it shall impose sentence under the
provisions of this act upon the person convicted in lieu of the sentence otherwise
provided by law.
19 ES. § 1166-1179 (1952).
93. 355 F2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966). In Gerchman, the court determined that the proceeding
under the Barr-Walker Act was a criminal hearing, not a sentencing or civil hearing.
Gerchman, 355 F.2d at 309. The Third Circuit, therefore, concluded that the Barr-Walker Act
violated the guarantee of procedural due process since it did not offer the safeguards
fundamental to a fair trial, particularly, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
Id.
94. Id.
95. 232 A.2d 45 (Pa. Super. 1967). The superior court concluded that the BarrWalker Act was unconstitutional based on the United State Supreme Court's consideration of
the Colorado Sexual Offender Act in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). In Specht, the
Supreme Court ruled that the Colorado Act was deficient in due process because due
process requires "a right to counsel, an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with
witnesses. .. , have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence.. . ." Specht, 386 U.S.
at 610.
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Act and Pennsylvania's Megan's Law, he nevertheless concluded
that the two statutes were more alike than different. 6 He,
therefore, determined that Megan's Law, like the Barr-Walker Act,
creates a separate criminal proceeding that requires "the full
panoply of due process protections." 7 However, Judge Temin held
that Pennsylvania's statute fails to offer such protection by
infringing on the right to avoid self-incrimination, 98 and the right to
a jury trial99 by shifting the burden of proof.100 Similarly, Judge
Callan of Blair County held that the statute violates due process by
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. 10'
Using a different analysis, Judge DiSantis of Erie County also
found that due process requires that the Commonwealth bear the
burden of proving that a defendant is a sexually violent predator.0 2
He followed the analysis employed by the Third Circuit in E.B. v.
Verniero.' °3 Finding a potential deprivation of a liberty interest
under the sentencing provisions of Megan's Law, Judge DiSantis
balanced the private interests of defendants against Pennsylvania's
interests and concluded that the Commonwealth must bear the
burden of proof to minimize the risk of error.1°4 Following a similar
analysis, Judge Vardaro of Crawford County also ruled that due
process requires that the Commonwealth bear the burden of
proof. 10 5 Judge Vardaro, however, based his holding on a
recognition of a liberty interest in the right to reputation under the
96. Morris, No. 0597 of 1997 (C.P. Philadelphia County, Oct. 29, 1997) at 17-18.
97. Id. at 18.
98. Id. at 21. Citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), Judge Temin deternned that
a defendant is "entitled to be warned that his statements may be used against him, that he
has the right to remain silent, and has the right to have counsel present during any interview
conducted pursuant to the purposes of the Act." Morris, No. 0597 of 1997 (C.P. Philadelphia
County, Oct. 29, 1997) at 18. In Estelle, the Supreme Court explained that "the availability of
the [Fifth Amendment] privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its
protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure
which it invites." Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462 (citation omitted).
99. Morris, No. 0597 of 1997 (C.P. Philadelphia County, Oct. 29, 1997) at 23.
100. Id. at 22. Judge Temin concluded that the Commonwealth should bear the burden
of proving "beyond a reasonable doubt" that a defendant is a sexually violent predator since
the statute is punitive in nature and a risk of error is involved. Id.
101. Rickabaugh, No. 97 CR 272, 273 (C.P. Blair County, Jan. 26, 1998) at 11. Judge
Callan found that the "full panoply of due process protections" requires the Commonwealth
to bear the burden of proving that a defendant is a sexually violent predator. Id.
102. Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 922 of 1997 (C.P Erie County, Sept. 23, 1997).
103. Id. at 15-20. Like the Third Circuit in E.B., Judge DiSantis applied the three-part
due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344-45 (1976). Williams, No.
922 of 1997 (C.P. Erie County, Sept. 23, 1997) at 16.
104. Williams, No. 922 of 1997 (C.P Erie County, Sept. 23, 1997) at 19.
105. Commonwealth v. Tate, No. 1996-689 (C.P. Crawford County, Oct. 22, 1997) at 10.
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Pennsylvania Constitution. 106
In contrast, Judge Anthony of Erie County rejected the
contention that Pennsylvania's statute violates procedural due
process. 10 7 Viewing the sentencing provisions of the statute as a
change of the maximum sentence for the predicate offenses,
instead of an enhancement, Judge Anthony upheld the
constitutionality of placing the burden of proof on the defendant by
considering it a mitigating factortte Moreover, Judge Anthony also
upheld the constitutionality of the presumption that persons
convicted of the predicate offenses are sexually violent predators
since the fact proven, that the defendant committed a predicate
sexual offense, has a rational relation to the fact presumed, that
the defendant has a mental abnormality, which increases the
chances that he will engage in the criminal activity again.'09
Likewise, Judge Freedberg of Northampton County ruled that the
Pennsylvania statute provides the necessary protections required by
procedural due process."10
As exhibited
above, these
challenges impose serious
constitutional obstacles for Pennsylvania's Megan's Law. After the
Third Circuit's decision in E.B., it is improbable that the statute will
pass constitutional scrutiny with respect to the procedural due
106. Id. at 5-6. Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in
pertinent part: "All men . . . have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among them are
...possessing and protecting... reputation.. . ." PA- CONST. art. I, § 8.
107. Commonwealth v. Larson, No. 2095 of 1996 (C.P. Erie County, Oct. 28, 1997) at 13.
108. Id. at 7-9. Judge Anthony explained that "it is constitutional for [a defendant] to
bear the burden of proving a mitigating factor, [i.e.] that he is not a sexually violent
predator," when the defendant is requesting to be excused from imprisonment after he/she
has been convicted. Larson, No. 2095 of 1996 (C.P Erie County, Oct. 28, 1997) at 8 (citing
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952)). In Leland, the Supreme Court permitted the state of
Oregon to place the burden of proving insanity beyond a reasonable doubt on the defendant.
Leland, 343 U.S. at 799.
109. Larson, No. 2095 of 1996 (C.P. Erie County, Oct. 28, 1997) at 10. Judge Anthony
recognized that the standard for considering the validity of the presumption is "whether
there is a rational connection between the fact proven and the fact presumed." Id. (citing
Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 631 A.2d 597, 604-5 (Pa Super. Ct. 1993).
110. Commonwealth v. Sanchez, No. 1456-1997 (C.P. Northampton County, Jan. 16,
1998). In Sanchez, Judge Freedberg rejected the assertion that the Pennsylvania statute does
not comply with procedural due process as set forth in Gerchman, Specht, and Dooley
because these cases did not decide the issues of the right to a jury trial or the allocation of
the burden of proof. Sanchez, No. 1456-1997 (C.P. Northampton County, Jan. 16, 1998) at
9-13. Concluding that the sexually violent predator provisions of the statute provide for a
sentencing hearing, Judge Freedberg stated that a defendant is not entitled to a jury trial. Id.
at 12. Furthermore, Judge Freedberg held that the burden of proof is not unconstitutionally
shifted to the defendant; it is an opportunity for the defendant to request leniency in
sentencing after the Commonwealth has proven that he committed a sexually violent offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 18.
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process guarantees of the United States Constitution. Furthermore,
the likelihood
of Pennsylvania's
Megan's Law surviving
constitutional challenges under the Pennsylvania Constitution is
equally dubious.
For the most part, the following constitutional challenges raised
pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution are identical to those
raised under the United States Constitution: the statute violates the
Double Jeopardy,"' Bill of Attainder," 2 Cruel and Unusual
Punishment," 3 Ex Post Facto" 4 and Due Process"' Clauses as well
as the Right to Privacy." 6 Thus, the courts that have addressed
Pennsylvania's Megan's Law intertwined their analyses of these
issues with those raised under the parallel provisions of the United
7
States Constitution."
Surprisingly, none of the trial courts expounded on the broader
111. Article I, section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in pertinent part
"No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .. " PA.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
112. Article I, section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "No person shall be
attained of treason or felony by the Legislature." PA. CONST. art. I, § 18.
113. Article I, section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
"[NIor [shall] cruel punishments [be] inflicted." PA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
114. Article I, section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
"No ex post facto law... shall be passed." PA. CONsr. art. I, § 17.
115. Article I, section 9 provides, in pertinent part "In all criminal prosecutions the
accused ... [cannot] be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of
his peers or the law of the land." PA CONsT. art. I, § 9.
116. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recognized a right to privacy guarantee
under Article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides: "All men are
created equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, or acquiring, possessing
and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness." Denoncourt v.
State Ethics Comm'n, 470 A.2d 945, 94748 (Pa. 1983) (quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 1). In
Denoncourt, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained the right to privacy under Article
I section 1 as: "(1) a freedom from disclosure of personal matters and (2) the freedom to
make certain important decisions." Denoncourt, 470 A.2d at 948 (citation omitted). In
addition, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recognized a right to privacy in Article I,
section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Denoncourt, 470 A.2d at 948. Article I, section 8
provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize
any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
117. The trial courts commonly referred to the guarantees provided by these provisions
of the Pennsylvania Constitution as "parallel" or "co-extensive" to those provided under the
United States Constitution; therefore, the courts did not offer separate discussions under the
Pennsylvania Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, No. 1456-1997 (C.P Northampton
County, Jan. 16, 1998),; Commonwealth v. Morris, No. 0597 of 1997 (C.P. Philadelphia County,
Oct. 29, 1997); Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 922 of 1997 (C.P. Erie County, Sept. 23, 1997).
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protection of the right to privacy recognized by the Pennsylvania
appellate courts under the Pennsylvania Constitution.118 For
example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania extended greater
privacy protection to bank records under Article I § 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution than the Supreme Court of the United
States has recognized under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 119 Following the lead of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania found an
expectation of privacy under the Pennsylvania Constitution in
telephone numbers dialed by an individual, even though the
Supreme Court of the United States refused to recognize a privacy
interest under the United States Constitution. 20 Although the trial
118. As explained by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: "[T]his court, when
considering the relative importance of privacy as against securing criminal convictions, has
struck a different balance than has the Supreme Court of the United States, and under the
Pennsylvania balance, an individual's privacy interests are given greater deference than under
federal law." Commonwealth v. White, 669 A-2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995). Judge DiSantis from Erie
County did address the right to privacy guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution in
Commonwealth v. Williams; however, he did not comment on the decisions in which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized broader privacy interests under the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Williams, No. 922 of 1997 (CP. Erie County, Sept. 23, 1997).
Quoting the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380,
1385 (Pa. 1990), Judge DiSantis stated:
The right of privacy is protected by the Constitutions of the United States and by this
Commonwealth. (citations omitted). Of course, an individual's right to privacy is not
obsolete; however, where a person asserts a legitimate expectation of privacy, that
expectation cannot be violated without a judicial balancing of respective interests in a
judicial determination that the government or other private party has compelling
needs and interests which justify invasion of privacy.
Williams, No. 922 of 1997 (C.P. Erie County, Sept. 23, 1997) at 14.
119. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979). In United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976), the Supreme Court concluded that a bank depositor does not have
an expectation of privacy in bank records under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Pennsylvania's supreme court declined to follow the Court's decision in Miller
and analyzed the issue under the Pennsylvania Constitution. DeJohn, 403 A.2d at 1289. The
court explained: "For a state court interpreting a state constitution, opinions of the United
States Supreme Court are like opinions of sister state courts or lower federal courts. While
neither binding in a constitutional sense nor precedential in a jurisprudential one, they are
entitled to whatever weight their reasoning and intellectual persuasiveness warrant .. ." Id.
(citation omitted). Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
concluded that bank customers have an expectation of privacy in their bank records. Id. at
1291.
120. Commonwealth v. Beauford, 475 A.2d 783 (Pa. Super. 1984). In Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735 (1979), the Supreme Court of the United States declined to find an expectation
of privacy in telephone numbers dialed by an individual and, therefore, ruled that the use of
a pen register is not a search under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania rejected the reasoning of Smith and found
a right to privacy in telephone communications under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Beauford, 475 A.2d at 789-92. The superior court explained: "[I]t cannot be doubted that this
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court opinions discussed in this comment failed to address the
broad privacy protections of the Pennsylvania Constitution, they
121
should be considered by the appellate courts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is virtually impossible to predict whether Pennsylvania's
Megan's Law will survive constitutional scrutiny since the courts
have not uniformly interpreted the numerous constitutional
challenges raised under the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions. The Third Circuit's decision in E.B. will undoubtedly
influence the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on the
procedural due process issue, since Pennsylvania's Megan's Law
follows New Jersey's version by placing the burden of proof on the
defendant. In addition, the statute is subject to the broad
protection accorded the right to privacy under the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
The legislature enacted Pennsylvania's Megan's Law to protect
the safety and welfare of the citizens of Pennsylvania, specifically
the children. Despite the numerous constitutional obstacles, the
statute has generated tremendous public support that will
ultimately prevent its abolishment. Consequently, the Pennsylvania
legislature will probably amend, rather than repeal, the statute to
balance the constitutional rights of sex offenders with the
protection of society.
Stephie-Anna Kapourales Fernsler

state has the constitutional power to guard individual rights, including the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures, more zealously than the federal government does
under the United States Constitution." Id. at 788 (citations omitted).
121. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated: "Here in Pennsylvania, we have
stated with increasing frequency that it is both important and necessary that we undertake
an independent analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution, each time a provision of that
fundamental document is implicated.. . ." Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 894-95
(Pa. 1991). In Edmunds, the court refused to adopt a "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 894-95.
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APPENDIX A
Following the inclusion of the Megan's Law amendment, the
Jacob-Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Program provides:
(a) In general
(1) State guidelines
The Attorney General shall establish guidelines for
State programs that require (A) a person who is convicted of a criminal offense
against a victim who is a minor or who is convicted of
a sexually violent offense to register a current address
with a designated State law enforcement agency for the
time period specified in subparagraph (A) of subsection
(b)(6) of this section; and
(B) a person who is a sexually violent predator to
register a current address with a designated State law
enforcement agency unless such requirement is
terminated under subparagraph (B) of subsection (b)(6)
of this section.
(2) Court determination
A determination that a person is a sexually violent
predator and a determination that a person is no longer a
sexually violent predator shall be made by the sentencing
court after receiving a report by a State board composed
of experts in the field of the behavior and treatment of
sexual offenders, victim rights advocates, and
representatives from law enforcement agencies.
(3) Definitions
For purposes of this section:
(A) The term "criminal offense against a victim who is
a minor" means any criminal offense that consists of (i) kidnaping of a minor, except by a parent;
(ii) false imprisonment of a minor, except by a
parent;
(iii) criminal sexual conduct toward a minor;
(iv) solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual
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conduct;
(v) use of a minor in sexual performance;
(vi) solicitation of a minor to practice
prostitution;
(vii) any conduct that by its nature is a sexual
offense against a minor, or
(viii) an attempt to commit an offense described
in any of clauses (i) through (vii), if the State(I)makes such an attempt a criminal offense;
and
(II) chooses to include such an offense in
those which are criminal offenses against a
victim who is a minor for the purposes of
this section.

For purposes of this subparagraph conduct which is
criminal only because of the age of the victim shall not be
considered a criminal offense if the perpetrator is 18 years of
age or younger.
(B) The term "sexually violent offense" means any
criminal offense that consists of aggravated sexual
abuse or sexual abuse (as described in sections 2241
and 2242 of Title 18 or as described in the State
criminal code) or an offense that has as its elements
engaging in physical contact with another person with
intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual
abuse (as described in such sections of Title 18 or as
described in the State criminal code).
(C) The term "sexually violent predator" means a
person who has been convicted of a sexually violent
offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder that makes the person likely to
engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.
(D) The term "mental abnormality" means a congenital
or acquired condition of a person that affects the
emotional or volitional capacity of the person in a
manner that predisposes that person to the commission
of criminal sexual acts to a degree that makes the
person a menace to the health and safety of other
persons.
(E) The term "predatory" means an act directed at a
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stranger, or a person with whom a relationship has
been established or promoted for the primary purpose
of victimization.
(b) Registration requirement upon release, parole, supervised
release, or probation
An approved State registration program established under this
section shall contain the following elements:
(1) Duty of State prison official or court
(A) If a person who is required to register under this
section is released from prison, or placed on- parole,
supervised release, or probation, a State prison officer,
or in the case of probation, the court, shall(i) inform the person of the duty to register and
obtain the information required for such
registration;
(ii) inform the person that if the person changes
residence address, the person shall give the new
address to a designated State law enforcement
agency in writing within 10 days;
(iii) inform the person that if the person changes
residence to another State, the person shall
register the new address with the law
enforcement agency with whom the person last
registered, and the person is also required to
register with a designated law enforcement
agency in the new State not later than 10 days
after establishing residence in the new State, if
the new State has a registration requirement;
(iv) obtain fingerprints and a photograph of the
person if these have not already been obtained in
connection with the offense that triggers
registration; and
(v) require the person to read and sign a form
stating that the duty of the person to register
under this section has been explained.
(B) In addition to the requirements of subparagraph
(A), for a person required to register under
subparagraph (B) of subsection (a)(1) of this section,
the State prison officer or the court, as the case may
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be, shall obtain the name of the person, identifying
factors, anticipated future residence, offense history,
and documentation of any treatment received for the
mental abnormality or personality disorder of the
person.
(2) Transfer of information to State and the FBI
The officer, or in the case of a person placed on
probation, the court, shall, within 3 days after
receipt of information described in paragraph (1),
forward it to a designated State law enforcement
agency. The State law enforcement agency shall
immediately enter the information into the
appropriate State law enforcement record system
and notify the appropriate law enforcement
agency having jurisdiction where the person
expects to reside. The State law enforcement
agency shall also immediately transmit all
information described in paragraph (1) to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for inclusion in
the FBI database described in section 14072 of
this title.
(3) Verification
(A) For a person required to register under
subparagraph (A) of subsection (a)(1) of this section,
on each anniversary of the person's initial registration
date during the period in which the person is required
to register under this section the following applies:
(i) The designated State law enforcement agency
shall mail a nonforwardable verification form to
the last reported address of the person.
(ii) The person shall mail the verification form to
the designated State law enforcement agency
within 10 days after receipt of the form.
(iii) The verification form shall be signed by the
person, and state that the person still resides at
the address last reported to the designated State
law enforcement agency. The person shall include
with the verification form, fingerprints and a
photograph of that person.
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(iv) If the person fails to mail the verification
form to the designated State law enforcement
agency within 10 days after receipt of the form,
the person shall be in violation of this section
unless the person proves that the person has not
changed the residence address.
(B) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall be applied
to a person required to register under subparagraph (B)
of subsection (a)(1) of this section, except that such
person must verify the registration every 90 days after
the date of the initial release or commencement of
parole.
(4) Notification of local law enforcement agencies of
changes in address.
A change of address by a person required to
register under this section reported to the
designated State law enforcement agency shall be
immediately reported to the appropriate law
enforcement agency having jurisdiction where the
person is residing. The designated law
enforcement agency shall, if the person changes
residence to another State, notify the agency
shall, if the person changes residence to another
State, notify the law enforcement agency with
which the person must register in the new State,
if the new State has a registration requirement.
(5) Registration for change of address to another State
A person who has been convicted of an offense
which requires registration under this section
shall register the new address with a designated
law enforcement agency in another State to which
the person moves not later than 10 days after
such person establishes residence in the new
State, if the new State has a registration
requirement.
(6) Length of registration
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A person required to register under subsection
(a)(1) of this section shall continue to comply
with this section, except during ensuing periods
of incarceration, until(A) 10 years have elapsed since the person was
released from prison or placed on parole, supervised
release, or probation; or
(B) for the life of that person if that person(i) has 1 or more prior convictions for an offense
described in subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section;
or
(ii) has been convicted of an aggravated offense
described in subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section;
or
(iii) has been determined to be a sexually violent
predator pursuant to subsection (a)(2) of this
section.
(c) Penalty
A person required to register under a State program
established pursuant to this section who knowingly fails to so
register and keep such registration current shall be subject to
criminal penalties in any State in which the person has so
failed.
(d) Release of information
(1) The information collected under a State registration
program may be disclosed for any purpose permitted
under the laws of the State.
(2) The designated State law enforcement agency and any
local law enforcement agency authorized by the State
agency shall release relevant information that is necessary
to protect the public concerning a specific person
required to register under this section, except that the
identity of a victim of an offense that requires registration
under this section shall not be released.
(e) Immunity for good faith conduct
Law enforcement agencies, employees of law enforcement
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agencies, and State officials shall be immune from liability for
good faith.
(f) Compliance
(1) Compliance date
Each State shall have not more than 3 years from
September 13, 1994, in which to implement this section,
except that the Attorney General may grant an additional
2 years to a State that is making good faith efforts to
implement this section
(2) Ineligibility for funds
(A) A State that fails to implement the program as
described in this section shall not receive 10 percent of
the funds that would otherwise be allocated to the
State under section 3756 of this title.
(B) Reallocation of funds
Any funds that are not allocated for failure to comply
with this section shall be reallocated to States that
comply with this section.
(g) Fingerprints
Each requirement to register under this section shall be
deemed to also require the submission of a set of fingerprints
of the person required to register, obtained in accordance with
regulations prescribed by the Attorney General under section
14072(h) of this title.

